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Thomas Reid’s reply to scepticism involves an appeal to common sense. 
Since he often claims that no defense of common sense is required, he 
is sometimes misread as claiming that no defense could be given. Yet 
Reid does defend common sense. This paper explores how he does so. 
Before engaging Reid directly, however, I want to consider two other 
ways in which Reid is sometimes misread.
First, Norman Daniels () reads Reid as follows: Reid finds com-
mon sense to be trustworthy only because it is given to us by a be-
nevolent God. Trust in common sense thus relies on theological prem-
ises, but these are no more secure than the claims that common sense 
is meant to support. Daniels writes, “Reid’s only defense against the 
skeptical outcome … that our constitutions might lead us to systemati-
cally false beliefs … is his belief that God would not deceive us.” 
Second, Philip de Bary () understands Reid as a reliabilist. 
Understood in this way, Reid’s position is that common sense is justi-
fied because it reliably leads to true belief. Common sense would be 
justified regardless of whether or why we accepted it, but there is this 
further question: Why should we believe that common sense is justi-
fied? It is justified if it will reliably lead us to the truth, but why believe 
that? The claim that our natural faculties are reliable is what DeBary 
calls the Truth Claim. We can assert the Truth Claim, but we cannot 
give a non-circular defense of it.
On both of these readings, the defense of common sense is an ar-
gument from explicit, metaphysical premises. We can then ask for a 
defense of the premises, but none can be given. I argue in what follows 
that both approaches misunderstand Reid’s defense of common sense. 
Admittedly, Reid does think that common sense can be trusted and 
that it is given to us by a benevolent deity. Yet, I will argue, he does 
. P. . Another theological reading is given by Brookes who, in his introduc-
tion to Reid (), portrays Reid as a ‘Providential Naturalist.’ On Brookes’ 
view, this appeal to the Almighty is secured by a kind of inference to the 
 best explanation.
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to the truth. His appeals to “the Almighty” may seem like Descartes’ 
conclusion that we can trust our faculties because we are endowed 
with them by a benevolent God the creator. For Descartes, this trust 
is the conclusion of an argument meant to escape scepticism. Indeed, 
both Reid and Descartes hold that perception is a source of epistemic 
authority separate from reason. However, there are several important 
dierences. For Reid, trust in our faculties comes at the beginning of 
enquiry. If we do not begin by placing some trust in our senses, he 
thinks, we will be impotent against the sceptic. Reid insists that reason 
and perception are both to be trusted and, moreover, should serve as 
correctives for one another.
Clearly with Descartes in mind, Reid says of the sceptic, “[T]hough 
in other respects he may be a very good man, as a man may be who 
believes he is made of glass; yet, surely he hath a soft place in his 
understanding, and hath been hurt by much thinking” (Inq, ch.  §, 
p. ). He says elsewhere that while the sceptic is in some ways like a 
lunatic, in other ways he does not dier from anyone else: 
A remarkable deviation from [the principles of common 
sense], arising from a disorder in the constitution, is what 
we call lunacy; as when a man believes that he is made of 
glass. When a man suers himself to be reasoned out of 
the principles of common sense, by metaphysical argu-
ments, we may call this metaphysical lunacy; which diers 
from other species of the distemper in this, that it is not 
continued, but intermittent: it is apt to seize the patient 
in solitary and speculative moments; but, when he enters 
into society, Common Sense recovers her authority. (Inq, 
ch. ., p. –) 
. (Inq, ch. ., p. ) Also “that almighty Author” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ), “the 
Author of my being” (ch.  §, ), etc.
. Reid’s example of a mad belief — believing that you are made of glass — is 
clearly meant to echo Descartes’ First Meditation list of what madmen believe. 
Reid also makes the same point elsewhere, in the context of considering 
Cartesian doubt explicitly: “Can any man prove that his consciousness may 
not think the former because of the latter; that is, he does not think 
that trust in common sense is something which we ought to deduce 
from the existence of God. Also admittedly, Reid thinks that common 
sense is a reliable guide to the truth. Yet he does not think that this is 
required as a premise to justify our trust in common sense; quite the 
contrary, he thinks we should trust common sense even if it were unre-
liable. In short, I argue that Reid’s defense of common sense is not an 
argument from dogmatically held premises — not premises about God, 
about our own capacities, or about anything else.
The next two sections explore Reid’s defense of common sense. I 
distinguish four arguments: (i) the argument from madness, (ii) the 
argument from natural faculties, (iii) the argument from impotence, 
and (iv) the argument from practical commitment. One may worry 
that there are indefensible premises lurking in these arguments. The 
subsequent section makes this worry precise by reconstructing the ar-
guments in contemporary Bayesian terms. “Indefensible premises” can 
be formally characterized in the Bayesian framework, allowing us to 
see that some of Reid’s arguments do not require them.
Reid insists that belief in an external world is something he is led to 
as “the immediate eect of [his] constitution” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ). 
He explains: 
The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of 
the external object which you perceive? This belief, sir, is 
none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of Nature; 
it bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right, 
the fault is not mine: I even took it upon trust, and with-
out suspicion. (Inq, ch.  §, p. –) 
He trusts in his faculties, trusts that properly applied they will lead 
. In citing Reid, I reference the Inquiry into the Human Mind as (Inq) and the 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers as (EIP). 
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Reid uses the phrase ‘common sense’ to mean these faculties other 
than reason — our senses, our memory, and so on. Reid writes that 
“original and natural judgements … serve to direct us in common life, 
where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are a part 
of our constitution, and all the discoveries of our reason are grounded 
upon them. They make up what is called the common sense of man-
kind …” (Inq, ch. ., p. ). By reason, for example, we believe the 
consequent of a conditional, given the conditional and its antecedent. 
By common sense, we believe that there are men in the street when 
we see them emerge from a coach. Each warrants beliefs in a certain 
way, and neither can do the work of the other.
We can call this Reid’s argument from natural faculties. It is sometimes 
reconstructed as a trilemma. We can trust either (a) all of our facul-
ties, (b) none of our faculties, or (c) some but not all of our faculties. 
Consider these options in turn:
a. If we trust all of our faculties, then we trust percep-
tion as providing prima facie warrant for believing 
in the things that we seem to perceive. So too for 
memory and things remembered. Radical scepti-
cism is swept away.
b. If we trust none of our faculties, then we have no 
warrant to believe anything. Just as much, we have 
no ground for doubting anything. So scepticism 
would be unmotivated and presumptive.
c. If we trust some but not all of our faculties, then 
which ones should we trust? The sceptic rejects 
the senses because they can be fooled. Yet, as Reid 
notes, 
[Our faculties] are all limited and imperfect …. 
. The fact that Reid thinks of reason as something distinct from common sense 
is suggested by his rhetoric throughout — e. g., that he aims to “reconcile rea-
son to common sense” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ).
We may call this the argument from madness. Schematically, it proceeds 
in this way: 
. Believing P would be mad.
. Therefore (one should believe) ¬ P. 
One may object: ‘Madness’ is familiar in a pejorative use, applied 
to views that we find uncongenial — views that we judge are not to be 
believed. As such, insofar as the argument is valid, the “one should be-
lieve” in the conclusion is more about social acceptability than about 
epistemic justification. It is more like “One should not chew with one’s 
mouth open” than “One should not believe a contradiction.” Even if 
we could make out the argument as one we would want to endorse, 
the sceptic is free to reject its conclusion. He need not pay any great 
price to deny inferences of this form. If the sceptic lives without incur-
ring sanction from the community, then his is a benign form of mad-
ness and this argument would be insucient to shake him from it.
There is another important strand of Reid’s argument. He argues 
that by accepting the authority of reason, the sceptic accepts the au-
thority of our natural faculties. If one is in the business of accepting 
the authority of natural faculties, and if one concedes that perception 
is one of the natural faculties, then it makes no sense to attempt radical 
doubt with respect to the perceivable world.
Reasoning in the Cartesian way allows us to formulate sceptical 
arguments that discredit sense perception, but reason is one of our 
faculties just as perception is. Reason and perception are both ways in 
which we naturally form beliefs. Why should we trust the faculty of rea-
son if we refuse to trust the faculty of perception? Reason cannot prove 
the reliability of our senses, but neither can the senses observe the 
reliability of reason. If we are to trust either, we ought to trust both.
not deceive him? No man can: nor can we give a better reason for trusting it, 
than that every man, while his mind is sound, is determined, by the constitu-
tion of his nature, to give implicit belief to it, and to laugh at or pity the man 
who doubts its testimony” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ).
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if we trust our reason, but that does not show that we should trust our 
reason. Reid does in fact trust both, but admits that there is no proof 
that we should trust either. It is odd even to ask for a proof if we begin 
distrusting reason.
Reid escapes doubt, perhaps, but does so by trusting his faculties. 
Trust in a particular perception is not a dogmatically held premise. 
Common sense allows room for criticism. Our senses have a positive 
presumption, in that seeing is grounds for believing, but the presump-
tion is defeasible.
Moreover, Reid does have more to say against the sceptic. In the 
next section, I concentrate on a rich section of the Inquiry in which 
Reid gives three further replies to the sceptic.
As we have seen, Reid’s appeal to Common Sense — construed either 
as an argument from madness or as an argument from natural fac-
ulties — is not a direct answer to the determined sceptic. The deter-
mined sceptic might still reject reason and the senses both. Reid rarely 
addresses even the possibility of such an indomitable sceptic, but he 
explicitly concedes: “Perhaps the sceptic will agree to distrust reason, 
rather than give any credit to perception” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ). After 
acknowledging this possibility, Reid oers three reasons why he and 
“the sober part of mankind” would not follow the indomitable sceptic. 
I will first uncritically recount all three reasons and then consider each 
at greater length.
First, Reid insists that he is unable to disbelieve all that he per-
ceives. Even the sceptic “may struggle hard to disbelieve the informa-
tions of his senses, as a man does to swim against a torrent: but, ah! 
it is in vain …. For, after all, when his strength is spent in the fruitless 
attempt, he will be carried down the torrent with the common herd of 
believers” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ). It is no use for the sceptic to insist we 
should doubt everything if it is impossible to do so.
Second, Reid suggests that actually doubting the world, were such 
a thing possible, would only lead to disaster. Suppose, Reid says, “I 
We are liable to error and wrong judgment in the 
use of them all; but as little in the informations of 
sense as in the deductions of reasoning. And the 
errors we fall into with regard to objects of sense 
are not corrected by reason, but by more accurate 
attention to the informations we may receive by 
our senses themselves. (EIP, ess.  ch. , p. ) 
All of our faculties are fallible. We make errors in reasoning, we misre-
member, and so on. Fallibility will not privilege reason. Absent some 
motivation for trusting reason that is not also a motivation for trusting 
in the senses, scepticism would be capricious. 
We have no reason to accept either (b) or (c); they would presume 
scepticism rather than establish it. The sceptic can reply that (a) is no 
better established. We might presume (a), of course, but — the sceptic 
may say — such presumption would be no less capricious than pre-
suming (b) or (c).
We must admit to the sceptic that the argument from natural facul-
ties does not yield an unconditional conclusion. It is not a direct proof 
and it lacks deductive certainty. Although Reid would not have put it 
this way, we can think of it as being like a relative consistency proof. 
Mathematicians can prove that the axiom of choice is consistent with 
Zermelo-Frankel () set theory, provided that  is consistent. They 
can also prove it consistent relative to some other set of axioms, but no 
proof shows that  is consistent tout court. Most mathematicians do 
in fact believe that  is consistent, but there can be no direct proof of 
its consistency. Similarly, Reid argues that we should trust our senses 
. The argument from natural faculties is sometimes read as a reductio of the 
system of ideas, e. g., by de Bary (). Cuneo () maintains, as I do, that 
the argument applies more generally. The system of ideas does not enter as 
a premise of the argument. The conclusion is that we should place prima 
facie trust in our natural faculties, including perception. If the argument goes 
through, scepticism about the external world is defeated.
. Any consistency proof must suppose some axioms and — by Gödel’s incom-
pleteness theorem — any suciently powerful, consistent system of axioms 
cannot be used to prove its own consistency.
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research into it. Not only will this reason convince me, it is reasonable 
for me to be convinced.
The existence of the external world may be thought of similarly. 
The fact that I cannot help but believe in an external world provides 
me with a reason not to attempt withholding assent. That said, it re-
mains to be explained how I can know which beliefs I cannot help 
but accept. Some people claim to be able to withhold assent from the 
belief in an external world. Perhaps such gifted sceptics are dierent 
from the rest of us, but how could we know? Other people at other 
times have claimed that they could not but believe other, more contro-
versial things. The devout interlocutor may say that it is impossible not 
to believe in God, the mathematically retrograde interlocutor may say 
that it is impossible to deny the truth of the parallel postulate, and so 
on. Not only would I insist that it is in my power to doubt these things, I 
would suggest that their assessment of their own abilities reflects only 
a lack of imagination or determination. It is open to the sceptic to give 
the same reply, insisting that Reid’s belief that he cannot doubt the 
existence of the world reflects only his lack of imagination.
The argument from impotence fails, then, not for a lack of rhetori-
cal or justificatory force. Instead, the problem is that it turns on a prem-
ise about some matter of fact. Worse, people are often mistaken about 
this kind of premise, as the examples of God and the parallel postulate 
show. Any interlocutor may respond to the argument from impotence 
merely by denying the premise, and after they have done so there is 
little more to be said.
Reid’s second argument is that “it would not be prudent” to be a 
sceptic (Inq, ch.  §, p. ). We could read this merely as a fallacy old 
and notorious enough to have a Latin name, an argumentum ad bacu-
lum. With even a modicum of charity, however, it is a richer argument.
Peter Baumann (, ) interprets Reid’s argument here as a 
bit of implicit decision theory. Epistemically, Baumann suggests, there 
is no fair way to decide whether we should embrace common sense or 
embrace scepticism. If there is an external world roughly like the one 
that we seem to be in, then we would be right to do the former but 
wrong to do the latter. Otherwise, we would be wrong to do the former 
resolve not to believe my senses. I break my nose against a post that 
comes in my way; I step into a dirty kennel; and, after twenty such 
wise and rational actions, I am taken up and clapt in a madhouse” (Inq, 
ch.  §, p. ). There is a commitment in practice to the existence 
of an external world that contains many of the snares and pitfalls in 
which realists believe.
Third, Reid notes that scepticism about the world can only arise 
after many years of living in the world; the doubt is only possible af-
ter a long history of trust. He puts the point this way: “I gave implicit 
belief to the informations of Nature by my senses, for a considerable 
part of my life, before I had learned so much logic as to be able to start 
a doubt concerning them” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ). The track record of 
perception has been good, and without perception we would never 
have come so far as to be able to entertain the possibility of doubt. 
Before taking up the question of scepticism, we have already put trust 
in our faculties. It is too late to call our whole life into doubt. We are 
already trusting a great deal.
If the sceptic persists in doubting after such reasons, Reid thinks 
that there is no ultimate argument with which to force assent. Let’s 
consider each of these arguments in turn.
In the first of the three further replies, Reid alleges that scepticism 
is in some sense impossible. This argument from impotence turns on a 
psychological claim. Suppose Reid is right that I am utterly incapable 
of denying the existence of an external world. This does not show that 
my belief in it is justified. Nevertheless, it does give me a reason to 
accept that belief.
Consider a parallel case: The fact that perpetual motion is impos-
sible does not show that I ought not build a perpetual motion machine, 
in the sense that it would be wrong for me to do so. It seems plau-
sible to say that neither right nor wrong attach to building such a ma-
chine. Nevertheless, this fact convinces me that I should not spend 
time attempting to invent perpetual motion machines, even though 
they would be very useful if only they were possible. The force of 
this ‘ought’ is both rhetorical and rational. If I come to be convinced 
that perpetual motion is impossible, I will also come to give up any 
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Furthermore, Baumann’s interpretation fails to reflect Reid’s actual 
argument. Reid does not argue that scepticism would lead to disaster 
conditional on there being a world. Quite the opposite. He considers 
the scenario in which there is no world and in which Nature has de-
signs to deceive us. Even were that so, it would be imprudent to be a 
sceptic. Quoting Reid at greater length: 
If Nature intended to deceive me, and impose upon me 
false appearances, and I by my great cunning and pro-
found logic, have discovered the imposture; prudence 
would dictate me in this case … to … not call her an im-
postor to her face, lest she should be even with me in an-
other way. For what do I gain by resenting this injury? 
You ought at least not believe what she says. This indeed 
seems reasonable, if she intends to impose upon me. But 
what is the consequence? I resolve not to believe my 
senses. I break my nose against a post that comes in my 
way …. (Inq, ch.  §, p. –) 
Reid is quite clear that scepticism would end in disaster, even condi-
tional on the assumption that Nature deceives us.
Reid grants arguendo that common sense deceives us. Even given 
such deception, he argues, we should trust common sense. This pas-
sage does more than undercut Baumann’s decision-theoretic recon-
struction; it also undercuts readings of Reid as a reliabilist (e. g., de Bary 
()). Reid is so far from dogmatically asserting the Truth Claim that 
he says we would be justified in trusting common sense even if the 
Truth Claim were false. He is not recommending common sense just 
insofar as it will lead to the truth, but even on the assumption that it 
mires us in falsehood.
Baumann’s version of the argument might be revised by changing 
the payo matrix. Regardless, the sceptic has a ready answer to any 
decision theoretic argument: Methodological doubt is about belief but 
same value. Yet there is no determinate value; it is rather as if we fill in both 
of them with a number divided by .
but right to do the latter. This symmetry means that neither common 
sense nor scepticism wins out, absent dogmatic question-begging.
Practically, the situation is dierent. Baumann constructs a payo 
matrix for the choice between common sense and skepticism (see 
figure ).
There is an external world No external world
We follow common sense few broken noses nothing really
We become sceptics many broken noses nothing really
 : Baumann’s payo matrix
As Baumann explains, “The outcomes of common sense are always at 
least as good as those of scepticism and they are better under at least 
one circumstance” (, p. ). In the language of decision theory: 
Given that we prefer few broken noses to many broken noses, follow-
ing common sense weakly dominates becoming a sceptic. There are 
worries about dominance reasoning in decision theory, but I do not 
think any of them are relevant here. Baumann is right to say that we 
ought to accept common sense if this is the correct payo matrix.
Baumann suggests that the matrix is unproblematic. He writes that 
it involves only “conditional judgments [that] are not controversial 
between sceptics and non-sceptics” (, p. ). I find this puzzling. 
The left-hand column of the payo matrix seems uncontroversial, but 
I do not see how to arrive at values in the right-hand column. I am un-
certain what the consequences of any of my actions would be if there 
were no external world. Without some specification of what there is 
instead, absent a world, there is no well defined utility for doing any-
thing. Baumann’s argument requires that ‘nothing really’ means we are 
indierent between the two right-hand outcomes. Yet ‘nothing really’ 
is uncontroversial only if we treat it not as indierence but as com-
plete inability to say how satisfactory or unsatisfactory the outcome 
would be. 
. If we were to fill in the cells with numerical values for expected utility, 
Baumann’s argument succeeds if we fill in the two right-hand cells with the 
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is a world. This issues in a conditional conclusion. The sceptic may 
challenge the form of the inference, of course, by arguing that behav-
ing much as common folk do does not entail believing as common 
folk do. Perhaps some sense could be made out of a sceptical lifestyle 
that does not presuppose an implicit belief in the external world. If 
this cannot be done, then the sceptic must concede that her practice 
implies certain beliefs. She is left with a choice of abstaining from her 
practice or accepting the beliefs. The argument from practical commit-
ment cannot force her choice, but it makes her pay a higher price if she 
remains a sceptic.
In the last of the three further replies, Reid observes that he gave 
his senses “implicit belief” before he developed enough sophistication 
to even entertain scepticism (Inq, ch.  §, p. , quoted above). De 
Bary () reads this as a track-record argument, of the sort discussed 
by Alston (). On de Bary’s reading, the argument infers from the 
faculties’ having led us to the truth in the past to the conclusion that 
they can be relied on to do so in the future. Such an argument is circular, 
because it relies on the natural faculties in collecting evidence that the 
natural faculties are reliable. The debate then becomes whether this 
circularity is fatal to the argument. I want to suggest a dierent reading 
of the passage. Reid observes that he lived as ordinary folk for many 
years and that scepticism could only be motivated in light of things 
he had learned in the course of ordinary life. He need not claim that 
his natural faculties have previously given him the truth. Rather, the 
argument relies on the mere fact that any would-be sceptic has — un-
til now — relied on her natural faculties. The very observations which 
motivate scepticism come from trusting memory and the senses. 
For instance, Descartes says that he has dreamt of such and so. The 
dream argument yields doubts about his present sensation because 
he accepts those memories. It fails as an argument for scepticism tout 
. Although even Descartes would not allow for such a possibility, the possibil-
ity of such a lifestyle is a central issue in evaluating Phyrronism; cf. Burnyeat 
and Frede ().
not about action. In the First Meditation, Descartes claims that he “can-
not possibly go too far in [his] distrustful attitude. This is because the 
task now in hand does not involve action but merely the acquisition 
of knowledge” (AT ). Descartes’ method would have us navigate 
the world just as believers do even while we pretend to doubt. Reid 
anticipates such a reply, however, insisting that anyone who navigates 
the world just as believers do is a believer, regardless of their written 
protestations to the contrary. Reid puts the point this way: “If a man 
pretends to be a sceptic with regard to the informations of sense, and 
yet prudently keeps out of harm’s way as other men do, he must ex-
cuse my suspicion, that he either acts the hypocrite, or imposes upon 
himself” (Inq, ch.  §, p. ). It is easy to misread this passage. In 
contemporary English, “he imposes upon himself” is awkward at best. 
When I impose on my relatives, I make their lives dicult; so when 
the sceptic imposes on himself, one might think, he makes his own 
life dicult. On this reading, the argument does seem to be about con-
sequences. Yet Reid uses ‘impose’ in an older sense to mean that the 
sceptic is self-deceived. 
In the Discourse on Method, Descartes makes a similar point when 
discussing how he should decide what his countrymen believe: “[I]n 
order to discover what opinions they really held I had to attend to what 
they did rather than what they said…. [M]any people do not know 
what they believe …”(AT ). We should judge people by their actions, 
Descartes says, because their actions most reveal what they believe.
Call this the argument from practical commitment: The ordinary prac-
tices of people who are able to navigate the world indicate that they 
know their way around in the world and that they believe that there 
. Citations to Descartes are from the translation by Cottingham et al. (); 
pagination follows their marginal numbering, the pagination of the Adam 
and Tannery edition (AT).
. Jonathan Bennett treats the passage as I do in his “translation” of the Inquiry. 
Wolterstor () gives a similar reading of the argument but treats it mere-
ly as “an extra fillip” that Reid adds to (what I’ve called) the argument from 
impotence.
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seen. He attempts to show that scepticism would have consequences, 
and demands that would-be sceptics face up to them. A first princi-
ple is connected to other principles, he insists: “It draws many others 
along with it in a chain that cannot be broken. He that takes it up must 
bear the burden of all its consequences; and if it is too heavy for him to 
bear; he must not pretend to take it up” (EIP, ess.  ch. , p. ).
Nevertheless, there is an important dierence between the argu-
ments in the Inquiry and those in the Essays. The latter are about first 
principles, principles that are explicitly propositional, “axioms” which 
enter into inference as self-evident premises (cf. EIP, ess.  ch. , p. ). 
On the face of it, this is incompatible with my reading of the Inquiry. If 
Reid answers the sceptic by appealing to principles of common sense, 
and if these principles are premises, then Reid is relying on explicit 
premises rather than trusting in his faculties. It is possible that Reid’s 
thinking on the issue shifted, but I want to argue instead that the de-
fense of first principles — on a more careful reading — reflects the same 
argumentative strategies as the earlier Inquiry.
Reid suggests several ways in which first principles might be iden-
tified and defended. First among these is the “argument ad hominem” 
in which it is shown that “a first principle a man rejects, stands on the 
same footing with others which he admits” (EIP, ess.  ch. , p. ). 
Importantly, Reid does not argue that a sceptic can be answered just 
by noting that scepticism is at odds with some first principle. Rather, a 
principle that the sceptic does accept (that reason is reliable, for exam-
ple) “stands on the same footing” as other principles that the sceptic 
denies (that the senses are reliable). This is what I’ve called the argu-
ment from natural faculties. Reid’s immediately goes on to give a nice 
summary of the argument: 
[T]he faculties of consciousness, of memory, of external 
sense, and of reason, are all equally the gifts of Nature. No 
good reason can be assigned for receiving the testimony 
of one of them, which is not of equal force with regard 
to the others. The greatest Sceptics admit the testimony 
court. But without such an argument, we trust perception as prima fa-
cie warrant to believe in the things perceived. In appealing to our past 
experience of dreams, Descartes implicitly asks us to trust our memory 
and senses; but our belief as to whether we are awake or dreaming 
will only be underdetermined if we give up trusting our senses once 
the rival hypotheses are spelled out.
This is a variant of the argument from natural faculties. In terms of 
the trilemma discussed above, the sceptic accepts (a) when collecting 
evidence but switches to (c) when evaluating the evidence. The would-
be sceptic has, as a matter of fact, trusted natural faculties like reason, 
perception, and memory. Any justification for doubting them must 
rely on evidence obtained by trusting them. So the sceptic is in the 
unstable position of advocating scepticism and throwing out the moti-
vation for scepticism. Perhaps there is no explicit contradiction in this, 
but it reveals that the price of consistent scepticism is rather high. 
The previous section considered primarily Reid’s response to scepti-
cism in the Inquiry. In the later Essays on the Intellectual Powers, we see 
similar arguments, especially in the sections concerning first principles. 
Reid maintains that there are no direct arguments for first principles. 
Nevertheless, the principles can be defended. Reid explains: “[I]t is 
contradictory to the nature of first principles to admit of direct or apod-
ictical proof; yet there are certain ways of reasoning even about them, 
by which those that are just and solid may be confirmed …” (EIP, ess. 
 ch. , p. ). His argumentative strategy is similar to what we have 
. One might instead think that for Descartes methodological scepticism is 
presumed. The sceptical scenarios serve as exercises to help us shake o our 
obdurate belief in an external world, rather than as arguments to convince 
us that we should shake it o. Regardless of what Descartes’ intention might 
have been, Reid and many later commentators read the sceptical scenarios as 
arguments for scepticism.
. Wolterstor () gives a reading of the argument somewhat between mine 
and de Bary’s. He argues, in eect, that perception is presupposed by a track-
record argument.
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If a sceptic should build his scepticism upon this foun-
dation, that all our reasoning and judging powers are 
fallacious in their nature, or should resolve at least to 
with-hold assent until it be proved that they are not; it 
would be impossible by argument to beat him out of this 
stronghold, and he must even be left to enjoy his scepti-
cism. (EIP, ess.  ch. ., p. ) 
Although Reid sometimes says that scepticism is impossible, that is not 
the point here. Scepticism (according to Reid) is a natural consequence 
of the project of doubting everything, whether or not we are constitu-
tionally capable of carrying out that project. If we could execute such 
a project, then we would refuse to believe anything — but the project 
presumes an unreasonable standard of evidence.
When we reason to a conclusion that we have no other grounds to 
reject, we accept the argument. When we see a cat sitting on a table 
and have no reason to suspect dreams or animatronics, we accept that 
there is a cat. If indeed these are our natural faculties, this is an ob-
vious standard. We trust our faculties. How could we do otherwise? 
How else would we form beliefs other than the ways in which we 
 form beliefs? 
Rather than being merely psychological or practical, this is funda-
mentally rational. It involves a claim about how one should respon-
sibly apportion belief and doubt; that is to say, it involves a theory of 
evidence. As Reid admits, it is always possible for a sceptic to insist on 
the strictest standard. In such a case, it will not be possible to dislodge 
the sceptic with rational arguments alone: What counts as reason-
able is just one of the things in dispute! By appealing to the sceptic’s 
own commitments, both practical and cognitive, we can try to show 
that the sceptic ought not accept such a strict standard. The commit-
ments serve as an arational starting point, but — given these commit-
ments — the force of the argument is rational. It might be nice to make 
a stronger reply than this, since the sceptic is always free to struggle in 
an eort to throw o these prior commitments. What would a stronger 
reply be like? We could argue that the sceptic’s struggle is doomed to 
failure, but this is a claim about the sceptic’s incapacities. This claim 
of consciousness, and allow, that what it testifies is to be 
held as a first principle. If therefore they reject the imme-
diate testimony of sense, or of memory, they are guilty of 
an inconsistency. (EIP, ess.  ch. , p. ) 
It is important to note that the sceptic is not urged to accept the plati-
tude that the senses are reliable, but rather to admit the testimony of 
the senses. What our natural faculties testify is to be believed as a first 
principle, which is just to say that the faculties are to be trusted.
Reid also oers, in passing, a version of the argument from practi-
cal commitment. He writes, “Our ordinary conduct in life is built upon 
first principles … and every motive to action supposes some belief” 
(EIP, ess.  ch. , p. ). To say that beliefs are implicit in our actions 
cannot be an appeal to explicit premises. Rather, our practice provides 
an indirect argument for ways of arriving at explicit beliefs.
There is certainly more to be written about the relation between 
Reid’s early and later works. I only mean to have argued that the inter-
pretation of Inquiry § that I defended above can be maintained when 
considering the later Essay .
We have seen so far that Reid does oer arguments as to why we should 
trust common sense: I have called these the argument from madness, 
the argument from natural faculties, the argument from impotence, 
and the argument from practical commitment. Not all of these are 
good arguments, but some of them are. They give us some reason to 
put prima facie trust in our reason, perception, and memory.
As Greco () argues, Reid’s replies to the sceptic rely on a theory 
of evidence. Roughly, the standard of evidence is this: Beliefs formed 
on the basis of natural faculties such as reason, perception, memory, 
and so on should be given a positive presumption of truth. Indeed, 
this is already our standard of evidence; we are committed to counting 
perception and memory as sources of evidence. Reid’s arguments will 
not be an irrefragable answer to a determined sceptic who is willing 
and able to consistently renounce these commitments. Reid puts the 
point this way: 
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sentences, where degrees of belief are real num-
bers. As a matter of notation, we denote an agent’s 
degree of belief in P as Pr (P).
. An agent’s degrees of belief should accord with 
axioms of the probability calculus. For example, 
Pr (P) + Pr (¬ P) = .
. After an agent learns something, the agent’s de-
grees of belief should change so that the new de-
grees of belief (the posterior probabilities) equal 
the prior probabilities conditional on the evidence. 
When the agent learns E, Prposterior(P) = Prprior(P | E) 
for all P. This is called “conditionalizing on E.”
The formula known as Bayes’ rule follows from this constraint, along 
with the theorem that
 Pr (P | E) = 
Pr (E | P) Pr (P)
  Pr (E)
Within this framework, there is no objective constraint on agents’ pri-
or degrees of belief. Nevertheless, convergence theorems are taken to 
show that dierences “wash out” in the limit of enquiry. Given a suf-
ficient number of sunrises, for example, any two agents will eventually 
agree that the sun will rise tomorrow. There is still a sense in which 
their agreement depends on their prior degrees of belief. Suppose that 
two specific agents agree after one thousand sunrises. If a third agent 
had assigned a lower prior to the sun rising tomorrow, then he would 
not agree with them yet. He would require more sunrises in order to 
be convinced — perhaps one thousand more, perhaps one million. If 
his priors are suciently eccentric, the time-to-agreement can be ar-
bitrarily long. 
There is something wrong with a belief if it depends merely on 
prior probabilities, i. e., if arbitrary agents would not agree on it in 
. Earman () provides a useful, critical summary of convergence theorems.
itself relies on a matter of fact about which it is possible to be scepti-
cal. We could instead argue that the sceptic should in some binding 
sense accept these commitments, but that proof will itself suppose a 
standard of proof. Not only are Reid’s arguments workable tools, then, 
but we would be hard-pressed to find better ones.
For all that, one might worry that these arational starting points 
are just dogmas in fancy dress. Yet they escape the worry, voiced by 
Daniels, that common sense must bottom out in theism. They also 
escape de Bary’s worry that we must explicitly know a Truth Claim 
about how our natural faculties will track the truth. They rely just on 
a standard of evidence that is woven into our cognitive and practical 
lives. Yet one may worry that there is some illicit premise in these 
arguments. In the remainder of the paper, I want to argue against this 
possibility by considering parallel arguments that can be made within 
Bayesian epistemology.
My approach here becomes somewhat ahistorical. Although Reid 
was a contemporary of Thomas Bayes and was probably aware of 
Bayes’ work on probability, I do not know of any place in the Reid cor-
pus where it is explicitly discussed. Reid mentions Bayes once, but in 
the context of natural theology. In the published edition of Reid’s  
lectures on natural theology, there is a reference to Divine Benevolence, 
a pamphlet by “Boyce” (Duncan , p. ). Elmer Duncan (personal 
communication) informs me that this was mistranscribed and that the 
original refers to Bayes.
Regardless, I want to consider what Earman () has called 
Modern Bayesianism. It consists of the following claims:
. An agent’s beliefs can be represented as assign-
ments of degrees of belief to propositions or 
. Like Van Cleve (), I understand Reid to be providing principles of evi-
dence rather than principles of truth.
. Jerey (, p. xi) provides a concise summary of the position, which he 
calls “basic probability theory from a thoroughly ‘subjective’ point of view.” 
Reid surely did not have anything like it in mind; on the connection between 
Bayes’ original work and recent Bayesianism, see Earman ().
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. Therefore, Pr (I believe that P) is high. 
Construed in this way, the argument is a disaster. An agent who ac-
cepts the argument is not thereby led to a high degree of belief in P. 
Rather, the agent has a high degree of belief in ‘I believe that P ’. This 
yields a belief in P only if the agent has a high degree of belief in the 
further premise Pr (P | I believe that P). There is no requirement that 
Bayesian agents accept premises of this kind. 
This formulation conditionalizes on ‘I act in that way’ and thus re-
lies on a rational constraint to establish the reliability of the senses. Yet, 
according to Reid, reason cannot justify perception. So this formula-
tion fails to capture what Reid had in mind. It over-intellectualizes the 
appeal to practice.
Reid’s argument is not oered as a straightforward argument that 
P. Rather, it is oered as a tool for dislodging ersatz sceptics from their 
feigned scepticism. It makes use of a connection between belief and 
action. This connection is not merely a matter of prior probabilities in 
the Bayesian framework but instead is built into the framework itself.
Take a step back and ask what, for the Bayesian, connects practice 
to belief. Rational constraints on degrees of belief are often justified 
by Dutch Book arguments. If an agent violates constraints of rational-
ity — for instance by assigning Pr (P) + Pr (¬ P) >  — then it is possible 
to construct a Dutch Book: a series of bets that the agent would judge 
to be fair but that would result in the agent’s losing money regardless 
of what the world is like. Such arguments make sense only if we think 
that an agent’s behavior will reflect their degrees of belief. More pre-
cisely, what count as an agent’s degrees of belief are determined by the 
way that the agent would make risky decisions. 
The argument from practical commitment can be understood in 
this way: The sceptic pretends to assign a low value to Pr (P). Yet when 
. One might try to argue for such a requirement. The premise Pr (P | Pr (P) = ) =  
is an instance of the Reflection Principle; but the Reflection Principle is con-
troversial. Failure to assign a high degree of belief to this premise would lead 
to Moore’s paradox; but Moore’s paradox is not a logical contradiction. In any 
case, the argument so construed is not Reid’s argument.
. Although such discussions typically resolve around betting behavior, an 
agent has degrees of belief even if they refuse to take overt bets.
the arbitrarily long run. So we have a precise way of saying, within the 
Bayesian framework, whether an argument relies on dogmatic prem-
ises: It does so if it requires specifying a prior probability of  or  for a 
contingent proposition, or if it requires specifying priors in a way that 
will not be washed out by convergence. Within the Bayesian frame-
work, our question of whether Reid’s arguments depend on dogmatic 
premises takes on this form: Do Reid’s anti-sceptical arguments de-
pend on prior probabilities in such a way? We need to consider each in 
turn, but the short answer is that some of them do and some of them 
do not.
First, consider the argument from madness. If we suppose that P is 
a claim of common sense, then the argument is that ¬ P is mad — it is so 
outré that a rational agent would never adopt it. Within the Bayesian 
framework, the only way to make a belief so taboo is to assign it a 
prior probability of . Since Pr (¬ P) = , Pr (¬ P | E) =  for all possible 
evidence E. One could never rationally come to assign a higher prob-
ability to ¬ P. This relies entirely on the value of the prior Pr (¬ P). If an 
agent were to assign any non-extreme degree of belief to the claim of 
common sense, then there might be evidence that would lead to an 
upward or downward revision of that degree of belief.
Second, consider the argument from impotence. Suppose that an 
agent is unable to resist a belief in P. If the agent assigns a prior prob-
ability between  and  and yet is still utterly incapable of shaking the 
belief regardless of the evidence, then the incapacity is irrational. This 
would fail to capture Reid’s argument. Reid thinks that common sense 
cannot be established by reason but does not think that it overtly con-
tradicts reason; it is arational but not irrational.
So suppose instead the incapacity is rational. Within the Bayesian 
framework, the prior probability of P must be . Again, the argument 
depends entirely on this prior probability.
Third, consider the argument from practical commitment. We might 
naïvely reconstruct the argument in this way:
. Pr (I believe that P | I act in a certain way) is high. 
. I act in that way. 
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P by conditionalizing on some evidence E or if P is itself evidence. 
Otherwise, they are presumed to maintain a constant Pr (P). That is, 
Bayesian agents remember their degrees of belief. A faculty of memo-
ry is thus a presumption of the Bayesian framework. It is crucial to note 
that this is not a belief presumed by Bayesian agents themselves. They 
do not observe “I seem to remember that P ” and conditionalize with 
Pr (P | I seem to remember that P). Rather, Bayesian agents are constituted 
so as to accurately remember their degrees of belief. This, like percep-
tion, is distinct from reason. Bayesian agents with no memory would 
exogenously change all their beliefs from moment to moment. This 
would be logically consistent, but nonetheless epistemically bankrupt. 
In Reid’s idiom, memory is a crucial natural faculty.
Unfortunately, this captures only declarative memory. Reid does 
not treat memory as primary declarative. Remembering that P is, for 
Reid, merely knowing that P. Genuine memory, as Reid thinks of it, is 
episodic. I remember a conference in Waco because I can recall having 
been there and not merely because I know facts about it. (Copenhaver 
() provides further discussion of Reid on this point.) I do not see 
any straightforward way to represent episodic memory in the Bayesian 
framework.
Second, testimony. Reid thinks that the argument from natural fac-
ulties justifies trust in the testimony of others. Not so for the Bayesian. 
It is natural to treat testimony, as Earman () does, as evidence 
that somebody A says E. The resulting degree of belief in E is the poste-
rior Pr (E), which is equal to the prior Pr (E | A says E). This conditional 
probability need not be high, so — for the Bayesian — a priori trust in 
testimony requires specific values for prior probabilities; that is, it re-
quires unjustified premises.
Note that these caveats about memory and testimony apply only to 
the argument from natural faculties, not to the argument from practi-
cal commitment.
In this section, I have treated Bayesianism as including a com-
mitment to conditionalization. Although defenses of conditionaliza-
tion are problematic, it is often presumed in applications of Bayesian 
performing actions to which P is relevant, the agent acts as if P. The 
agent is thus self-deceived in denying the degrees of belief that are 
apparent from his actions.
Fourth, consider the argument from natural faculties. Providing a 
Bayesian explication of the argument from practice required asking 
how practice is reflected implicitly in the Bayesian framework. Similarly, 
explicating the argument from natural faculties requires asking how 
perception, memory, and testimony are construed in the framework.
When an agent observes E, she conditionalizes and sets Pr (P) to 
the prior value of Pr (P | E). The new value for Pr (E) is directly set at . 
The new value of Pr (E) is not determined by any rational constraint. 
E’s counting as evidence is a necessary precondition for conditional-
izing. As Reid might say, the Bayesian agent trusts perception.
One might object that this is too quick. The Bayesian framework 
presupposes that there are exogenous changes of belief (ones not 
prompted by conditionalization). Calling some propositions ‘evidence’ 
is suggestive, but the account gives no guidance as to which proposi-
tions those ought to be. These might be deliverances of natural facul-
ties, but they might be any other propositions whatsoever.
It seems to me that this just underscores the parallel with Reid. As 
Reid would have it, rationality must be supplemented with trust in our 
senses. There is no ultimate principle that can stop us from becom-
ing sceptics and refusing to accept the evidence of our senses. It is no 
accident, however, that typical Bayesian models describe agents who 
conditionalize on propositions that we would count as evidence. We 
do trust our natural faculties, and we build this into the models.
With respect to perception, the Bayesian reconstruction of Reid’s 
argument from natural faculties does not depend on prior probabili-
ties. A fortiori, it does not rely on degrees of belief in the existence 
of God or in the reliability of our natural faculties. Yet Reid aims to 
defend more than just perception with the argument. Consider two 
further faculties.
First, memory. It appears in the Bayesian framework only im-
plicitly. Bayesian agents may change their degrees of belief in some 
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